More on Hoppe (et all) vs Popper (from elsewhere)

[H]oppe would argue (and has) that the following statements are not possible to contradict – that they are falsifiable, but that is impossible in any circumstances for them be false.
1) increases in the minimum wage increase unemployment.
2) increases in the supply of money cause increases in prices.
3) democracy is simply a slow process of adopting communism.
Any circumstance under which any of these statements is false, is a statement of time and externality, not of the scope of the statement itself.

And this is why his argument is correct (true) within the framework of action:

Any change in the description of circumstances would mean a change in the meaning of the terms minium wage, unemployment, and externality. Any change in the meaning of newtonian gravity would mean a change in the concept of gravity that is open to direct experience. (In other words, as Popper advices elsewhere, our problem lies in our concept of measurement and the calculus of measurement.)

So, correctly stated, ACTION has a higher standard of temporal truth than does SCIENCE, and science a higher standard of inter-temporal truth, because science is discovery (the patterns will not change), and ACTION is invention because the pattern of relations are EXPECTED to change, yet we must act in real time to outwit the dark forces of time and ignorance.

Within the context of ACTION, the Newtonian theory of gravity is sufficiently precise for the actions to which it need be applied. It is insufficiently precise for larger and smaller relations. But for the scope of action it describes (direct experience), it is in fact, ‘true’. The error was made by those who attempted to extend it into different domains (where tools are needed to experience gravitational effects. Tools expand our perceptions, so we must extend our concepts with our tools.

And, it does not mean that any of these concepts likely to be falsified, even though they are falsifiable. It means that the scope of the statement does not require further precision than the statement contains. (The argument, for example, that there is no real reason for this apple not to fall through the table top. It’s just that the chance of such an event occurring requires a time frame many times greater than the existence of the known universe.) For the purpose of action in real time, this statement is true.

This is the difference between Humean and Popperian scientific criticism of induction, and the utility of induction for the purpose of taking action. It is also why Popper is ‘weak’ in that he maintains analytical philosophy’s attachment to the metaphysical problem – rather than fully moving into Naturalism. This ‘halfway’ postion is why he’s open to criticism.

The mistake in widespread application of the arguments against induction derives from the failure to treating philosophy as a symbolic language for the manipulation of the natural world that exists in our heads, and giving priority to science rather than the phenomenon of experience that we gain from constant bombardment of our short term memory by stimuli both direct and reflected from our memories.

So, Hoppe is correct I think, just inarticulate, because he makes a similar error to Popper by confusing domains, even though he is correct because he uses a theory of action. Popper is wrong, I think, because he maintains the language of the metaphysical error – truth independent of action.

It’s only by contrasting these types of arguments that we can see the errors in each. ie: we must subject theories to external tests, not those which are proscribed by the philosopher, or constrained by the language of the philosopher.

[I] would agree that the mind body problem exists. However, evidence is, that the physical sciences are solving this, and that the philosophical program has been distracted by solving it.

Philosophy is a language for transforming external information into perceptions. It is in fact, a system of measurement and calculation. But measurements and calculations must come from outside of us – if only because our internal ‘tools’ are not precise enough to self-analyze, and because we are prone to a pretty significant array of cognitive biases – and philosophy, as well as all other forms of measurement and calculation, must help us overcome those perceptual biases and errors.

Our ability to perceive, remember, and calculate (categorize, compare and manipulate) the world is actually incredibly weak. But with language to form networks of perception and calculation with others so that we can perceive more than we can on our own. Writing to store those perceptions and judgements for later consumption. Philosophy to test and manipulate objects, properties and relations (calculate). Tools for extending our perception. And measurements for transforming the output of those tools into sensations that we can perceive, and compare, we can compensate for our inherent weakness. That is: we have incredibly scary-good associative memories, but terrible short term memories, and the ability to grasp only three to five concepts at a time, on perhaps two axis. And while that is good for throwing stones and spears, it is notoriously terrible for understanding the flow, pool and eddy that most of the universe consists of, under Mandelbrotian fractal complexity, to us which appears as kaleidic uncertainty: … “magic”.

This means that the problem is in the scope of our statements in the context of our necessary actions. Not a problem with induction per se. But instead, a problem of induction when the scope of the problem is greater than the scope of action we attribute to it. Again, this is because philosophy is still trying to cure itself of the disease of the metaphysical problem. Religions die hard.

The criticism I’m levying is that popper is trapped in his era of philosophy (analytical proper) and Hoppe is not (action proper) probably stands. Hoppe’s argumentation ethic probably doesn’t stand. Hoppe’s criticism of popper’s recommendation that we experiment with policy despite the fact that economic statements such as the example he’s given, are open to experimentation, is in fact, a criticism that Popper is an advocate of the error of positivism.

Or something like that. I am not done experimenting with this line of argument obviously. The point being that deduction, induction, and abduction are simply statements about the amount of information we lack.

I have covered a very complex set of ideas here, and done the best I an in a short space. I hope it’s added some clarity. Perhaps it is just confusing.

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