PROBLEM STATEMENT
( … )
- Counsel: While we must seek to train individuals in a polity to intuit those behaviors that produce high trust within members of the polity, the human tendency to habituate those behaviors – contractual committments – beyond members of the polity is a natural and endless vulnerability to the polity. As such, explicitly stating that while natural law and high trust are an optimum ingroup behavior, by creating a process and procedure of inclusion and exculusion we also train and habituate that high trust is a commons of high cost to members, and must be earned reciprocally by non-members – even if we seek to extend trust where possible in order to create trust for mutual gain between members of polities and polities as a whole.
THEREFORE;
1.1 – BEFORE INCLUSION:
GIVEN the difference betwen:
… The Ingroup Insurers vs Outgroup and their insurers.
And the duration and durability of duration of rights, obligations, and inalienations (ROIs);
THEN;
… Given the insurers of self determination by self determined means, by sovereignty and reciprocity determine the membership or ‘ingroup’ then Ingroup Natural Rights (insured, unconditional, existential) vs Outgroup Allied Contractual Rights (insured, conditional) vs Outgroup Offered Potential Rights (uninsured, contitional) vs Outgroup Offered Opportunistic Rights (uninsured, transactional).
|Conditionality of Rights|: Ingroup Necessary Natural Rights > Ingroup Contractual Rights > Outgroup Allied Contractual Rights > Potential Rights > Opportunistic Rights
THEREFORE;
Given the three persistent possibilities and availability of the choices of interaction, by the incentives to predation, parasitism, deception, conflict and war, versus the incentives for cooperation, whether opportunistic, contingent, continuous versus the incentive for avoidance, boycott, disassociation, speparation, and defense;
AND GIVEN;
The extent of rights that are rational and useful are in proportion to the value and consistency of reciprocal cooperation minus the cost of irreciprocal non-cooperation,
THEREFORE;
The offering of rights in anticipation of reciprocal exchange of those rights is a utility for the purpose of developing that exchange of rights, and otherwise no rights exist; and as such no crime, ethics, or morals can exist between those who have not exchanged the rights of sovereignty and reciprocity.
AND;
Additionally, instead of assuming or granting rights, we offer the promise of exchange of rights, to the degree we wish to either incentivize coopration or incentivize war, conflict, predation, and parasitism.
THEREFORE;
The process of incremental increase in the exchange of promise of rights of sovereignty and reciprocity may continue, abate, or restart until the rights are fully exchanged.
UNTIL;
Parties fully integrate into the same polity and means of political decision making, by reciprocal insurance of Self Determination by Self Determined means by Sovereignty, Reciprocity, and Rights Obligations and Inalienations of marginal indifference between members and groups of members.